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1  Introduction
Economic historians now know that inequality has not been a constant feature of the 
Latin American landscape since the original colonization by Spain and Portugal. Rather 
it has fallen and risen several times over the two centuries of independence, and the 
dawn of the twenty-first century has also brought a welcome slight retreat from extreme 
inequality.1 Why the movements, and why the differences between countries?
Fortunately, the dawn of this century has brought not only a slight reversal of 
earlier inequality trends in Latin America, but also a blossoming of research on the 
sources of income inequality in the region today, lead by the World Bank and other 
international development agencies.2 This impressive wave of research has deliv-
ered an important part of what was promised by a World Bank call to arms back in 
the 1970s. Under the Presidency of Robert McNamara, a Bank team co-published 
the often-cited Redistribution with Growth, outlining how developing countries 
could produce more and share it more equally, and generating research momentum 
on these themes. Redistribution told a parable of some wise pro-growth egalitarians 
(Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan), in contrast to four Latin American countries that failed 
1 See in particular Frankema, Has Latin America Always Been Unequal? (2009); Williamson 
(2010); the entire special issues of Revista de Historia Económica, 28, 2 (2010); and Abad (2013a, 
b). See also the downloadable data set on inequality from around the world, 1820–2000, referenced 
and explained in van Zanden et al. (2014).
2 See DeFerranti et al. (2004), Lindert et al. (2006), Braceda et al. (2009), ECLAC (2010, 2012, 
2014), Lustig et al. (2011), the World Bank’s Aspire database, Public Finance Review (2014), and 
the Commitment to Equity project led by Professor Lustig.
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to follow this True Path. Brazil, Mexico, Panama, and Peru were characterized by 
some of the world’s sharpest inequalities and not particularly strong growth. In 
later years, ECLAC (1990, 1992) and the World Bank study Inequality in Latin 
America: Breaking With History? explored the same questions more deeply.3
Did government fiscal preferences add to the inequality? That is, what distribu-
tional role has been played by movements in government fiscal policy, versus such 
market forces as changes in technological bias, trade expansion, shifts in labor sup-
ply, and shifts in the rate of private accumulation of human capital? For most of the 
two centuries of post-colonial history, inequality movements must have been caused 
largely by the ebb and flow of such larger forces outside of government, for the 
simple reason that government remained so small. Yet government’s share of Latin 
American economies grew across the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, 
causing us to wonder how and when the region’s regimes became “progressive” or 
“regressive” in their fiscal redistribution, breeding equality, or inequality.
The spate of recent studies suggests that countries’ income inequalities in Latin 
America now differ as much from each other, and from inequalities in OECD coun-
tries on other continents, in their fiscal redistribution as in the pre-fisc original 
incomes they get from market forces. Among data-supplying countries, the Latin 
American countries stand out as the most unequal countries in terms of people’s 
final incomes, partly because they have more unequal original incomes and partly 
because their governments redistribute less.4 Why have they had so little progressive 
redistribution lately, even after the much-heralded retreat from peak inequality? 
And has the same been true for a century or longer?
This chapter’s strategy exploits the deep analysis of the twenty-first century 
distributional impact of fiscal policy, and uses it to explore episodes since the nine-
teenth century to initiate a history of fiscal incidence. We offer these tentative 
results:
 (1) Social spending has accelerated in the postwar era: Tax-funded social spend-
ing has risen throughout the region since the 1980s.5
3 Chenery et al. (1974), ECLAC (1990, 1992), and DeFerranti et al. (2004). Within the Redistribution 
with Growth study, most relevant for present purposes are Montek Ahluwalia’s chapters on inequality 
and the policies for alleviating it (Chaps. 1 and 4). Its brief coverage of Cuba as of the early 1970s 
(pp. 262–268) identified this as an egalitarian experiment, but was guarded and inconclusive.
4 This statement is based on a comparison of pre- and post-fisc inequalities in several countries in 
the first decade of this century. The sources are Lustig et al. (2011) for five Latin American coun-
tries, Buchele et al. (2013) for Uruguay, Sauma and Trejos (2014, Table 3, benchmark case) for 
Costa Rica, and Wang et al. (2012) for the rest. See these for the assumptions regarding fiscal 
incidence.
The estimates we are comparing here refer to the year 2004 with the following exceptions: 
Belgium—year 2000; Australia—2003; Sweden, France, and Israel—2005; Bolivia—2007; 
Chile—2008; Costa Rica 2010 and Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay—2009. For alternative 
measures of the primary and final gini coefficients, 1979–2011, see Solt (2009, 2014).
5 Like many of the statements in the literature and in this paper, this one must be read with the 
proviso “except for Cuba”. Most comparisons have been forced to keep Cuba off to one side, for 
want of sufficient data. We will note Cuban results where we can.
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 (2) The region invests little in its future today: Latin America redistributes less 
toward future generations than do other regions. Rather, the region is one of 
those, like Mediterranean Europe, where redistribution tilts away from 
investing in future generations and favoring the elderly in privileged formal 
sectors.
 (3) It has invested relatively little in infrastructure and education ever since inde-
pendence: Relative to other regions at comparable income levels, Latin 
America has invested less in its younger generations since the nineteenth cen-
tury, and since the middle of the twentieth century it has favored its privileged 
seniors than other regions have done. Even before the 1990s, when public 
education was the main form of social spending, less was committed to mass 
education than in East Asia, East Europe, or the Middle East at similar levels of 
average income. In what follows we note some important historical exceptions 
to this rule.
 (4) Progressivity has been meager. Aside from the Cuban Revolution, governments 
have redistributed only modestly, preferring a conflicted mix of “redistribution 
to the rich and the poor.”6
 (5) The rise of non-contributory public pension subsidies to retirees from the for-
mal sectors stands out as a path-dependent legacy that will continue to retard 
progressivity and public investment. A telltale sign of the strength of this com-
mitment is the design of the pension “reform” in Pinochet’s Chile and the coun-
tries that sought to emulate it later.
 (6) Chile has stood out, as a volatile, and initially regressive, redistributor since 
1973. Redistributive policy was visibly regressive in the Pinochet era, both on 
the expenditure side and with a seemingly regressive tax structure. Yet since 
1990 the net impact of its fiscal redistribution was slightly progressive in 
conventional Gini measures, because it benefited the rich less than their share 
of pre-fiscal income.
 (7) Military autocracies differed in their redistributive strategies. Military rule peri-
ods did not affect redistribution in the same way in all countries. Unlike Chile 
(1973–1989), the junta in Uruguay (1973–1985) left the tax and social spending 
mix alone, at low absolute levels. Argentina’s military rule (1976–1983) consoli-
dated the social security system for most of the period, whereas Peru’s military 
regime (1968–1980) was quite progressive.
 (8) Human investments have brought more durable, though delayed, gains relative 
to transfers, both in the growth of GDP and in holding down inequality. In par-
ticular, Costa Rica has gained ground against Uruguay by emphasizing primary 
and secondary education over pensions.
 (9) Social spending has been not only volatile but also pro-cyclical. Relative to GDP 
growth, annual changes in real social spending are at least two times or more 
variable. Moreover, they tend to follow the swings in economic activity.7
6 This expression is borrowed from the title of Lindert et al. (2006).
7 Clemens et al. (2007) have identified this pattern for 1990–2000s.
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2  Strategies for Tracing a History of Fiscal Incidence
Starting from the fiscal mix of this century and the distributional impacts on each 
household income quintile, we explore the implications of the historical movement 
in the fiscal mix. Like previous studies of fiscal incidence, ours uses imperfect and 
incomplete measures to provide insights into differences in progressivity and 
regressivity. These limitations are so strict that the fiscal incidence calculations are 
useful only as plausible suggestions about the direction of effect and the general 
orders of magnitude. As public finance textbooks warn their readers repeatedly, one 
should never imagine that all the possible effects of a particular set of budgetary 
flows have been worked out.
To be true to real-world budgetary processes and to pose interesting counterfactu-
als, one must weigh fiscal incidence on both the revenue side and the expenditure 
side, using a consistent definition of fiscal neutrality on both sides. Most studies have 
failed to do so. On the revenue side, studies of the progressivity (or regressivity) of 
taxation have typically assumed that the revenues are spent in proportion to pre-fisc 
original income, a rare outcome. On the expenditure side, studies of expenditure 
progressivity typically assume that the expenditures are financed by taxes that are 
fixed per person, another rare outcome. Real-world budgetary processes adjust rev-
enues and expenditures together, requiring a two-sided measure of progressivity.
In Latin American history, the expenditure side of the fiscal coin reveals more about 
differences between countries, and also yields more data. On the revenue side, Kenneth 
Sokoloff and Eric Zolt have noted a strikingly consistent regional pattern: Latin 
America, more than any other region, relied on taxing domestic consumption, with 
little or no direct tax on individual incomes or property. Latin America also tended to 
concentrate fiscal authority more in the hands of the central government (Sokoloff and 
Zolt 2006). In what follows, we extract most of the information on differences in pro-
gressivity or regressivity from differences in the size and composition of social expen-
ditures, rather than from differences in taxes or non-social expenditures.
To pose sensible counterfactuals about countries’ fiscal incidence, the analysis 
should also make international comparisons. There should be little interest in com-
paring the actual fiscal patterns with the zero-government counterfactual, as in the 
presentation of most estimates. Rather we should compare governments’ fiscal inci-
dence with those of well-documented real-world alternatives, such as Chile or the 
USA. In our overview of the longer history of redistribution, we will take up the 
Chilean case first, and compare other countries to Chile.
2.1  Redistribution Through Each Year’s Social Spending 
and Taxes
Governments channel their tax revenues into three kinds of expenditures: social 
spending, non-social spending, and debt reduction. The three have very different 
effects on the distribution of income. Estimating such effects requires figuring out 
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which levels in the income ranks get more or less from each kind of expenditure and 
the revenues that back it.
The first effect is that of a given social spending budget. That is the traditional 
focus of much of the fiscal incidence scholarship, and it has been updated skillfully 
and energetically in the recent literature on Latin America. We shall pursue the same 
theme at length, taking care to include public spending on health and education as 
well as social transfers, while also incorporating tax incidence into the calculations 
of progressivity or regressivity when we can.
To define our measures of impact on the rich, the middle, and the poor, we start 
with a budget identity for government:
 
S S SS N D Rit jt t kt+ - =  
Here Sit = the amount of the ith kind of social spending in time period t. Similarly, Njt 
is the amount of the jth kind of non-social spending (general administration, police, 
the military, infrastructure, and so forth), and Rkt is the kth kind of government rev-
enue (income tax, tariffs, other taxes, or income from government enterprises and 
assets). The revenues can cover less than the expenditures to the amount of Dt, this 
time period’s government budget deficit. All magnitudes are in current prices. Later, 
to add economic meaning, they will be converted into per-household magnitudes 
and divided by national product or by an income class’s average income.
The budget identity leads to measures of redistribution by following how the 
direct effects of spending and taxes on household incomes are divided among the 
five quintile ranks, from the poorest twenty percent of households (q = 1) to the rich-
est (q = 5). Like most of the literature on fiscal incidence, we humbly acknowl-
edge—and then ignore—all the serious reasons why these simple “flypaper” 
measures of redistribution fail to measure the full range of effects, including general- 
equilibrium effects through factor markets. To allocate each kind of social spending, 
and the taxes paying for it, across the income ranks, we define the benefits minus the 
costs for each quintile, or Bnet,qit, as
 
B S b cnet qit it qit qit, ,= -( )  













8 Each is the result of two components that are not separated in our paper. One is the distribution of 
“benefits per recipient” in each quintile, and the other is “coverage,” i.e., the number of persons in 
the quintile who receive any benefits at all. Incompleteness of coverage looms large in Latin 
America, and therefore affects the progressivity greatly: “Overall, about half of the population in 
LAC is not covered by any public transfer. Within the region, however, there is significant variation 
in coverage, with only 23 % of Peruvian citizens not receiving any public transfer as compared 
with 73 % of Mexicans without benefits” (Lindert et al. 2006, p. 23). Similarly, for each on the tax 
side, a quintile’s tax burden is a combination of the tax collected person paying and the share 
paying any at all.
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To explore “effects” or “impacts,” one must return to the familiar question of 
counterfactuals: “the effect of the observed budget—relative to what?” As we have 
already mentioned, the usual analysis unrealistically implies a zero-government alter-
native, because it tries to assign effects to the entire budget. To pose more realistic 
counterfactuals, we shrink the scale of the comparisons. We consider the social pro-
grams one by one, posing the counterfactual of removing that one real-world social 
program and the revenues that financed it, while leaving other social programs intact. 
Imagining a zero option for that one social program is not so unrealistic, since Latin 
America had done without most of these small social programs until just recently.
The other dimension of our implicit counterfactual about each social program 
hides within our phrase “and the revenues that pay for it.” Which revenues? There 
is no point in imagining that all government revenues are at stake, since their amount 
far exceeds the social expenditures under discussion. Lacking any sound economet-
ric estimates of which revenues increased at the margin when a given social pro-
gram was introduced and expanded, we make a reasonable simplifying assumption 
about the revenues that would not have existed in the absence of each social pro-
gram: For most of our historical measures, we assume that the same mix of revenue 
types would have held at the social program margin as we observe on the average. 
Thus if income tax were 16 % of all government revenue, state monopoly proceeds 
were 6 %, indirect taxes were 70 %, and tariffs were the other 8 %, these same shares 
would be assume to apply to the scaled-down amount of the social expenditures in 
question. We do not assume any deficit finance of the social programs, in order to 
keep the issue of the deficit separate.9
To give the measures meaning as commitments to redistribution shares of 
income, we need to divide the absolute net benefit measures of Bnet,qit by an income 
denominator, also expressed in current prices. For convenience and brevity, we 
divide all quintile groups’ benefit measures from social spending, whether gross or 
net of taxes, by the same common GDP denominator. We then compare such impacts 
on rich, middle, and poor income groups.10
One other shortcut is dictated by data limitations. The net benefit measures 
change over time in response to changes in three components of any social program: 
the program’s existence in a given year; its size as a share of national income; and 
its target efficiency, namely the extent to which it redistributes in favor of a particu-
lar group, usually the poor. We cannot pursue historical changes in the target effi-
ciency of the social spending programs. Their history is just too complex and 
under-documented. Accordingly, our journey back into the redistributive history of 
social spending can only follow changes in the existence and size of each category 
9 In later writings, we will apply the same assumption to the revenues that finance non-social 
spending, such as military or infrastructure spending.
10 A more common procedure is to divide all absolute redistributions to or from an income group 
by that same group’s income. To trace a history of such measures, however, requires a running set 
of income distributions. No such time series is available before mid-twentieth century, apart from 
occasional benchmark years. The one virtuous exception consists of Javier Rodriguez Weber’s 
time series on Chilean income inequality.
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of social spending, with the restrictive assumption that a given program had the 
same target efficiency in the past that it has today. This retreat is regrettable in large 
categories of social spending and taxation that kept the same name but shifted their 
progressivity or regressivity over time. As it happens, the Latin American history of 
fiscal redistribution limits the historical errors we commit by not following the 
changes in target efficiency over time. Many of the most progressive social pro-
grams did not exist before the 1980s, and have changed only a bit since. Also, the 
sizes of the individual social programs themselves capture most of the redistribu-
tion. We will also limit the loss from not knowing target efficiency by breaking up 
the historically dominant category of social spending, namely public education, into 
primary and secondary and tertiary education, which offer very different rewards to 
the different income ranks.
Fixing the target efficiency of social programs (again, the i’s) at their present-day 
patterns means that our absolute measures of net fiscal benefits for any income class 
(q) in years past (the variable t’s) will be
 
B S b cnet qit it qiT qiT, ,= -( )  
where the “T” subscript signals that the redistributive patterns (b’s and c’s) are those 
from “today,” usually a year at the start of the twenty-first century. In plainer words, 
our calculations of the fiscal incidence on different income classes will repeatedly 
ask The Question about any given year in the past:
The Question: How would the amounts of social spending programs, and the extra taxes 
that paid for them, have affected the incomes of the top, middle, and poorest income classes 
in that past year, if the benefits of those social programs, and those extra taxes, were distributed 
between income classes the way they are today?
In what follows we take advantage of the new information on how fiscal impacts 
are divided among quintiles to look not just at the movements of redistribution 
between rich and poor, but between rich and middle and poor, to explore the relation-
ship of the “middle-income class” to the observed fiscal redistribution. When did the 
fiscal climate favor, or disfavor, the middle-income ranks relative to those at the top 
and bottom of society? To supplement the usual emphasis on overall inequality 
between rich and poor, we will break it into two parts, looking separately at move-
ments in the fiscal treatment of the rich versus middle-income groups (top quintile 
vs. middle quintile) and at movements in the fiscal treatment of the middle and 
poorest groups (middle quintile vs. bottom quintile).
2.2  Non-social Expenditures and the Deficit: Investment 
and Redistribution Over Time
It would be tempting to explore how the different income ranks are affected by those 
other two kinds of public uses of funds: the government’s non-social expenditures 
(Ns in place of Ss), or to the overall budget surplus. Unfortunately, the paucity of 
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data on these incidences prevents our pursuing them in depth, and fixes our focus 
mainly on social spending and the revenues that pay for it.
Still, there is one major division within the non-social spending that has power-
ful redistributive meaning and is easy to document. Some kinds of non-social 
spending are investments that will clearly raise the incomes of future generations. 
If they are paid for by current taxes, these redistribute from older to younger gen-
erations. The most obvious examples are such infrastructure investments as trans-
portation structures, public buildings, science centers, and experiment stations. 
Other kinds of non-social spending have a more questionable claim to being 
investments in future generations. Running a budget deficit similarly redistributes 
from future generations toward the current generation. While such inter-genera-
tional redistribution is not at all the usual focus of the now-conventional studies of 
“fiscal redistribution” within a single year, the inter-generational issue proves to 
have been a distinctive problem for Latin America, and we must confront it first, 
before launching a longer exploration of the redistributions that play out completely 
within 1 year.
3  Today’s Redistributive Patterns in Latin America
The region redistributes income in distinctive ways. Before turning to today’s 
richly documented patterns in social expenditures, let us first stay with the theme 
of the inter-generational redistributions implicit in the patterns of recent non-social 
spending. The simple redistributive pattern in non-social expenditures is one that 
carries over to the shares of human investments in social spending.
3.1  Low Investment in Future Generations
Perhaps the most pervasive kind of redistribution between parts of society in modern 
peacetime is the redistribution between present and future generations of adults. 
Governments, businesses, and households all decide what share of their current 
incomes should be borrowed from the future or invested in it. Borrowing from the 
future may or may not raise inequality, now and later, depending on economic 
growth and how the borrowed funds are spent.
Was Latin American policy worse at investing in the future than policy in other 
continents? When? What roles were played in investment setbacks like the Latin 
American debt crisis of 1982? And was the failure to invest especially bad in 
income-leveling types of human investments, such as public education for the 
masses?
The investment component of government spending is notoriously difficult to 
separate out in the data for most countries, blocking our view of how Latin America 
contrasts with other regions in public non-social investment. Our view is also 
clouded by the long-standing difficulty in resolving how private investment in the 
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future is affected by taxation and by government capital formation. Our best short 
route is to look at the official, and imperfect, measures of total private and public 
formation of non-human capital in the national product accounts. Taking this one 
step delivers a much clearer view of something distinctive about the region.
The best-known measure of a region’s investing in the future is the share of 
national product that is channeled into forming non-human capital, both by private 
parties and by government. Ever since the 1960s we have been able to compare the 
private investment share for Latin America with the rest of the world’s shares, with 
the results shown in Fig. 1. Latin America has consistently shown less sacrifice of 
current consumption for accumulating future assets than the world as a whole, and 
particularly less than East Asia and the developing countries of the Middle East and 
North Africa.11 Eastern Europe and Central Asia have also invested greater shares 
than Latin America, even in the austere 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and central planning. Granted, India had a lower investment share than Latin 
America from the 1960s to the debt crisis of the 1980s, when Latin America’s 
investment rate was briefly the lowest among large regions; and granted, Africa 
South of the Sahara became the lowest-investing region from the late 1980s to the 
first decade of the twentieth century. Through it all, however, Latin America 
remained a below-average investor in future structures and equipment.
11 The low investment share has already been underlined by United Nations, ECLAC (2012, 
p. 117).
Fig. 1 Capital formation as share of GDP, World Regions, 1960–2012
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The region also invests little in human form. A cornerstone of modern growth has 
always been education in human skills and health. The traditional mechanism used 
by governments to promote such human development has been tax-based expendi-
tures on formal education. Ever since the dawn of publicly funded mass education 
in Western Europe and its English-speaking offshoots in the nineteenth century, 
Latin American countries have lagged behind other regions, even where they had 
comparable incomes per capita and similar capacity for raising government reve-
nue.12 Figure 2 and Table 1 underline this point with a present-day global snapshot. 
Latin American countries commit less to each child’s public education than other 
countries, where commitment is reflected in the generosity of funding per school-
age child and the ability to pay for it is reflected in GDP per capita.13 Some countries 
12 For a quantitative historical overview of the region’s disinclination to invest public money in 
mass schooling since 1870, see Lindert (2010). In terms of schooling outputs, its lagging behind 
all regions other than South Asia in the education attainment of adults since 1950 has been shown 
in Reimers (2006), Székely and Montes (2006, pp. 636–641), and Cohen and Soto (2007).
13 In general, having lower average education expenditure per child of school age also tends to be 
correlated with having greater inequality in education inputs and education outcomes. To see this 
tendency within Latin America, compare the figures in Table 1 with the measure of inequality in 
educational attainment found in ECLAC (2014, pp. 78–79).
Fig. 2 Supporting pensions vs. education: Latin America vs. others, 2010
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Table 1 Supporting pensions versus educating the young: Latin America versus other countries, 
2010
Support ratios
Public spending as 
a percent of GDP 
pensions education
Pension spending per 
person 65-up,/GDP 
per capita
Education spending per 
person 5–19/GDP per capita
Latin America
Argentina 7.4 5.8 0.58 0.24
Bolivia 1.5 7.6 0.28 0.22
Brazil 6.2 5.8 0.74 0.23
Chile 5.0 4.2 0.45 0.18
Colombia 3.5 4.8 0.53 0.17
Costa Rica 2.8 6.3 0.35 0.24
Dominican Rep 0.7 2.0 0.09 0.07
Ecuador 1.8 4.2 0.24 0.14
El Salvador 1.7 3.5 0.20 0.11
Guatemala 1.2 2.8 0.24 0.08
Guyana 0.1 3.7 0.02 0.10
Jamaica 0.7 6.4 0.07 0.22
Mexico 1.4 5.2 0.18 0.18
Paraguay 1.2 3.8 0.20 0.12
Peru 2.5 2.7 0.35 0.09
Uruguay 8.8 4.2 0.53 0.19
Venezuela 5.0 6.9 0.77 0.24
Other countries
Australia 3.4 5.8 0.20 0.31
Canada 4.2 5.5 0.24 0.33
France 12.5 5.9 0.59 0.35
Germany 10.7 5.1 0.44 0.37
Greece 13.5 4.1 0.60 0.30
India 2.2 3.3 0.40 0.11
Italy 14.1 4.5 0.57 0.34
Japan 8.8 3.8 0.32 0.29
Korea, Rep. 1.6 5.1 0.12 0.28
Poland 10.0 5.2 0.61 0.33
Portugal 10.8 5.6 0.50 0.38
Russian Fed’n 4.7 4.1 0.31 0.28
Spain 8.0 5.0 0.38 0.37
UK 5.4 6.2 0.27 0.37
USA 6.0 5.4 0.37 0.28
Vietnam 2.5 6.3 0.35 0.25
Sources and notes for Table 1 and Fig. 2: Public pension expenditures as shares of GDP are taken 
from Pallares-Miralles et al. (2012, Annexes II and III), and based in turn on the World Bank 
Pensions Database. The latter source explicitly notes that their pension expenditure data included 
both contributory and non-contributory pension benefits, contrary to our preference for data on 
non-contributory only
Government education spending as a percent of GDP, 2010: Unesco 2013 estimates from http://
stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer
UN populations by age group, 2010:http://esa.un.org/wpp/ExcelData/population.htm, accessed 17 
May 2013
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are reluctant to support anybody of any age group with taxpayers’ money, as in the 
Dominican Republic or Guyana. Others support their average elderly person quite 
generously, yet still commit much less to each child of school age, two global 
extreme cases being Brazil and Venezuela.14 Whether the pension money goes to 
rich retirees or to poor ones is a question to be taken up shortly. The essential point, 
though, is that the share of income going into educating children for future earning 
power is lower in Latin America than elsewhere in the world.
3.2  New Light on the Social Expenditure Side: Today’s 
Redistribution to Rich and Poor
What is now becoming clear about social expenditures comes to us mainly from 
some impressive team research efforts in The World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, and now the Commitment to Equity project headed by Nora 
Lustig.15 Taking advantage of the international agencies’ vast accumulation of 
household surveys since the 1990s, these teams have been able to allocate the annual 
benefits from social programs among the different parts of the income spectrum, 
from the richest quintile (top 20 %) down to the poorest.
Table 2 displays what the international research teams have found about the 
“progressivity” or “regressivity” of distribution through different social expendi-
tures in the decade 2000–2009. Our usual yardsticks for progressivity and regressiv-
ity of a public expenditure lie in the range between two popular assumptions about 
the taxes that pay for them. One assumption is an equal absolute tax, or foregone 
equal subsidy, on every household. This “poll tax” assumption divides the “clearly 
progressive” social programs of Table 2, in the left-hand column, from all the rest. 
Programs listed there on the left would prove to be progressive even if they were 
paid for by a (famously regressive) poll tax, a fixed amount of tax on each house-
hold. A more popular assumption, used by economists to define fiscal neutrality, is 
a flat percentage tax on all income or expenditure. This assumption divides the 
“clearly regressive” social programs, on the right-hand side of Table 2, from all 
the rest. The regressive ones are so tilted toward high-income recipients that they 
distribute benefits even more unequally than the distribution of pre-fisc original 
incomes, meaning that the distribution of final post-fisc incomes is even more 
unequal than the original distribution.
14 Here, as will happen again in what follows, the measure of pensions is not the “redistributive” 
measure we seek. Rather we seek the amount of “non-contributory” payments for pensions, at the 
expense of the general taxpayer. All too often the available measures include pension benefits that 
are matched by the contributions of the employed, mixing such self-insurance in with true redistri-
bution. Nonetheless, the available measures offer the right qualitative contrasts, even when they 
overstate the redistributive part of public pensions.
15 DeFerranti et al. (2004), Lindert et al. (2006), Braceda et al. (2009), Lustig et al. (2011), Buchele 
et al. (2013), Sauma and Trejos (2014), and Public Finance Review (2014).
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Table 2 Progressive and regressive social spending programs, Latin American countries, 
2000–2010
Redistribution result (see notes for definitions)













Education Pre-primary Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay
” Primary Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Peru,
Guatemala








Health Uruguay, Mexico Brazil
Consumption subsidies
” Food aid Costa Rica, Peru, 
Uruguay
” Gas, electricity 
subsidies
Bolivia Mexico







” Airline subsidies Argentina
” Water, potable Chile
Family aid Argentina, Brazil, 













The sources = Lindert et al. (2006), Lustig et al. (2011), Sauma and Trejos (2014, Fig. 6) and 
Buchele et al. (2013)
The definitions of redistribution results are
• “Clearly progressive” = Delivers more dollars per household to the poorer (lower quintiles) 
than to the richer. Thus it would be progressive even if financed by a poll tax
(continued)
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• “It depends” = Regressive in $, progressive in income shares = Fewer net dollars per household go 
to the poorer, but they receive a greater percentage of income than do the rich. It would be regres-
sive if financed by a head tax, but progressive if financed by a flat percentage tax on income
• “Regressive” = The distribution of benefits favors the rich even more than the distribution of 
original (pre-fisc) income
Some cases that straddle the border between "clearly progressive" and "it depends" are some pro-
grams that work out as nearly flat in absolute $ terms
• Argentine water and sanitation aid, and PAMI health
• Bolivia pensions
• Costa Rica health care and hospitalization
• Peru's two health subsidy programs (clearly progressive SIS health vs. ESSALUD health), and
• Uruguay secondary education
Table 2 (continued)
The results have rightly been summarized as “redistribution to the poor and the 
rich” among Latin America’s social expenditure programs since around the year 2000. 
Many programs were meant to be progressive, shifting income from rich toward poor; 
yet some programs may not do so, and a few programs clearly redistribute toward the 
rich. The most clearly progressive programs are basic family assistance and “condi-
tional cash transfers” (CCTs). The latter involve giving cash to poor parents (usually 
mothers) conditional on proof that their children were attending school and getting 
essential health care. The idea of means-tested CCTs was successfully invented and 
implemented in Brazil (bolsa familia, an extension of the previous bolsa escola) and 
Mexico (oportunidades, previously progresa). The clearly progressive CCTs have dif-
fused to other countries in Latin America and to other continents.
In the case of public subsidies to education, the progressivity of subsidies 
depends on the level of education. Having the taxpayers pay for primary education 
clearly helps out lower-income families in nearly every country studied in the recent 
literature on redistribution. Yet government subsidies to tertiary education, such as 
university, are often not progressive. The students getting the subsidies tend to be 
from better-off families than the average taxpayers, given that most taxes in Latin 
America are levied on items of mass consumption. Thus the progressivity or 
 regressivity subsidies to tertiary education “depends,” as shown in Table 2, on 
whether the government paid for the subsidies by levying the same absolute tax on 
every household or by levying a fixed share of household income.16
Consumption subsidies vary widely between clearly progressive and clearly 
regressive. The result depends on whether the subsidized commodity is a necessity 
of life or a luxury. Table 2 illustrates this variability by contrasting the means-tested 
subsidies on essential foods (Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay) and water (Chile) with the 
subsidies on airlines and agricultural estates (Argentina).
The impacts of public pension programs vary greatly, as Table 2 illustrates. 
Some are found to be clearly progressive (e.g., in Costa Rica, and Chile’s PASIS 
16 Cases of regressive or near-regressive subsidies to higher education abound throughout the 
globe. For a pioneering demonstration of the likely regressivity of funding for the University of 
California, see the widely cited and controversial study by Lee Hansen and Weisbrod (1969).
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pension benefits), while others are clearly regressive in four countries, and still 
others are in between.
In reaching these conclusions, the research teams have taken special care to iso-
late the effects of those pension benefits that are truly redistributed from those that 
are not. What they have isolated in their recent studies, and what we must isolate as 
much as possible in the historical data, are the non-contributory parts of the public 
pension programs, the parts paid for by general taxpayers. We need to avoid counting 
the pension benefits that are paid for by contributions from the employees them-
selves and by their employers. These are just part of the labor contract, and not 
redistributions through the government’s budgets.17 The recent wave of research has 
revealed some very large average shares of pension benefits not paid for by the 
recipients or their employers. Table 3 illustrates with recent information on pension 
program deficits as a share of the benefits paid. The researchers’ judgment is that 
these are true non-contributory (deficit) shares, and not run-downs from past 
 contributions. We return to the issue of pension deficits when exploring the quanti-
tative history of each country’s redistributive social spending.
The same kind of research on redistribution through social programs is extend-
ing around the globe. Some more global comparisons restricted to developing coun-
tries suggest a split in the Latin American degree of inequality reduction recently 
achieved by social protection and labor market programs. At the regressive end of 
17 In the case of pension benefits for government employees, whose employer is also the spender of 
tax revenues, redistribution cannot be identified just by looking at who paid the pensions. Rather 
one needs data on the deficit or underfunding of the public employee pensions, i.e., the amounts 
not covered by employer or employee contributions past or present.
Table 3 Average net pension subsidies in the early twenty-first century









Source and notes: The source is Lindert et al. (2006, p. 116)
For Brazil, pensions included (a) the system for private sector workers (RGPS) and (b) a system 
for public sector workers at the federal and sub-national levels of government (formerly RJU, then 
called RPPS). The deficit rates on these were averaged
For Chile, the authors used a weighted average of the 94 % deficit on INP benefits and an assumed 
zero percent deficit on AFP benefits. The figures necessarily exclude military pensions, for which 
the deficit was a high share
For the Dominican Republic, the general policy was for all pensions to be covered by contribu-
tions, even though not on a same-year basis
Mexico = weighted average for IMSS and ISSSTE
Peru = weighted average for SNP and Cedula Viva
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the scale, El Salvador, Paraguay, and Peru are among the few data-supplying countries 
with slightly regressive programs, ones that actually raise the Gini coefficient of 
inequality above that for original market incomes (along with Ghana, Rwanda, and 
Cambodia). Toward the more progressive end of the developing-country ranks are 
the four Southern Cone countries (ABC and Uruguay). Yet even these redistribute 
less progressively through their social programs than do the countries of the former 
Soviet zone.
Latin America’s status as an unequal and not-so-progressive region would likely 
show up in the intergenerational immobility, as distinct from inequality, of its 
incomes if we had sufficient data comparing income mobility around the world. As 
a workable proxy for such income mobility, we have a global comparison of inter-
generational mobility in years of schooling for the late twentieth century. Of the 42 
countries studied, the seven Latin American countries studied had the least educa-
tional mobility from parents to children. Clearly, the region has formidable barriers 
to one’s chances of changing ranks in education, given the position on one’s par-
ents.18 These barriers will soon reappear when we look at the restraints on the pro-
gressivity of public education finance.
Why is there so little redistribution in Latin America today? The near-null result 
has not emerged because of lack of scale, at least not for the whole region. In some 
Southern countries social spending has surpassed 20 % of GDP, a threshold that 
could define a “welfare state.” Rather, the politically implemented design of social 
spending and taxes is itself a mix of “redistribution to the rich and the poor,” with 
inconsistent social targets.
4  How Did This Happen?
4.1  The Evolution of Fiscal Mixes Since the Nineteenth 
Century
We can easily see the overall net result of fiscal redistribution since Latin American 
countries gained their independence. Indeed, if we were content to take a single leap 
back to the historical horizon of 200 years ago, the net result is obvious. Back then 
there was essentially zero government, as in most countries around 1820. The net 
changes over 200 years are simply the present-day patterns we have summarized in 
Table 1 and in Figs. 1, 2, and 3.
How did this happen? To know what forces have led to the present redistribu-
tions, and their limits, one needs to know the where and when. Narrative histories 
have painted an historical landscape filled with regime changes and clashes between 
18 See Hertz et al. (2007). To this list of 42, Mexico has now been added, and has the 14th lowest 
educational mobility between generations out of 43 (Velez-Grajales et al. 2014), just below the 
USA (16th lowest). We have not yet been able to determine whether the research procedures were 
the same for the Mexican study as for the other 42 countries.
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ethnic groups and special interests. New numbers can frame and support such 
paintings. We turn to the histories of some data-supplying countries, from which 
some patterns will emerge.
4.1.1  Chile Since 1842
Chile’s experience with fiscal redistribution is the mostly richly documented, and in 
recent years the most dramatic and controversial, of all countries in the region, aside 
from the Cuban Revolution. We shall use the size of Chile’s social budgets as a 
convenient baseline for commenting on the social spending efforts of each of our 
other five countries.
The rise of social spending as a share of GDP. Like the rest of the region since the 
1960s, the central government of Chile has expanded social spending, a prime vehi-
cle for fiscal redistribution, as shown in Table 4. And like the rest of the region, social 
spending evolved away from its being tiny and dominated by public education in the 
nineteenth century to devoting a rising share to transfers, especially  pension pay-
ments, rather than to human investments like public education and public health. The 
annual detail behind Table 4, however, shows the instability of Chile’s spending dur-
ing the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973–1989). Education spending 
Fig. 3 Relative social spending benefits and tax burdens for Chile’s top, middle, and bottom 
income classes, 1965–2013. Sources and notes: see Appendix 1
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Table 4 Social spending shares of GDP
Average social spending as % of GDP, current prices




1842–99 0.40 n.a. 0 0 0.40
1900–29 1.08 0.03 0 0.03 1.14
1930–39 1.94 0.56 0 0.17 2.67
1940–49 2.11 0.95 0 0.22 3.28
1950–59 2.15 1.31 0 0.11 3.57
1960–73 3.60 1.93 0 0.91 6.44
1974–79 3.40 2.42 0 8.44 14.27
1980–89 3.18 2.72 1.92 10.52 18.34
1990–99 2.90 2.27 5.68 1.83 12.67
2000–09 3.68 2.99 6.71 0.62 14.00
2010–13 4.05 3.64 6.34 0.60 14.64
Argentina, central government
1870–99 0.07 n.a. 0.04 n.a. 0.11
1900–29 0.34 n.a. 0.09 n.a. 0.43
1930–39 1.97 n.a. 0.44 0.32 2.74
1947–49 1.91 n.a. 0.41 n.a. 2.31
Argentina, central, provincial, and municipal
1950–59 1.95 1.10 1.50 n.a. 4.55
1960–69 2.45 1.35 1.75 a 5.55
Argentina, consolidated government
1970–79 3.55 1.95 5.22 4.62 15.33
1980–89 3.15 3.62 5.31 2.80 14.88
1990–99 4.13 4.65 8.01 3.45 20.24
2000–09 5.09 4.80 7.42 4.36 21.67
Uruguay, central government
1910–29 1.20 0.96 1.30 0.01 3.47
1930–39 1.56 1.27 3.99 0.05 6.87
1940–49 1.48 0.95 4.11 0.03 6.57
1950–59 1.56 1.12 5.44 0.15 8.27
1960–69 2.81 1.29 6.73 a 10.84
1970–79 2.63 1.79 8.48 0.37 13.27
1980–89 2.37 2.26 10.50 0.54 15.68
1990–99 2.25 3.02 12.03 0.84 18.14
2000–08 3.12 3.64 12.69 1.45 20.89
Costa Rica, central government
1936–39 1.37 0.48 0.22 n.a. 2.06
1940–49 1.52 0.49 0.30 n.a. 2.31
1950–59 1.44 0.29 0.39 n.a. 2.11
1960–69 2.83 0.40 n.a. n.a. 3.23
(continued)
L.A. Abad and P.H. Lindert
261
Table 4 (continued)
Average social spending as % of GDP, current prices
Public education Public health
Non-contributory public 
pensions Other Total
1970–79 3.00 0.32 n.a. n.a. 3.32
Colombia, central government
1905–29 0.37 n.a. 0.00 1.12 1.49
1930–39 0.33 0.27 0.00 0.95 1.55
1940–49 0.36 0.16 0.00 0.93 1.46
1950–59 0.52 0.31 0.00 1.33 2.17
1960–69 1.26 0.45 0.00 1.63 3.34
1970–79 2.12 0.91 1.73 1.32 6.08
1980–89 2.63 0.79 2.55 1.02 6.99
1990–99 2.50 1.03 4.29 0.95 8.76
2000–09 3.04 1.88 5.84 0.42 11.19
2010–13 2.98 1.99 7.36 0.88 13.20
Costa Rica, consolidated government
1980–89 4.04 4.80 4.26 1.98 15.07
1990–99 4.06 4.66 4.53 1.82 15.06
2000–09 5.41 5.39 5.46 1.89 18.15
2010–13 7.17 6.56 6.62 2.28 22.63
Peru, central government
1900–29 0.08 b b b 0.66
1930–39 0.38 0.21 b b 1.14
1940–49 0.97 0.37 b b 1.42
1950–59 1.92 0.43 b b 2.48
1960–69 3.85 0.97 b b 5.27
1970–79 3.48 1.00 b b 4.99
1980–89 2.57 0.99 b b 4.00
1990–96 2.43 0.89 b b 3.86
Peru, general government
1997–99 3.13 1.25 2.55 0.59 7.52
2000–09 3.05 1.72 3.27 1.66 9.70
2010–13 3.01 2.24 2.41 1.79 9.45
Sources: See Appendix 1
Notes
n.a = positive, but unknown and excluded from “other” and from “total”
(a) = included in pensions
(b) = included in total social spending
For each decade, the averages refer to the data-supplying years within that decade, sometime refer-
ring to fewer than 10 years
For the underlying annual data, see http://gpih.ucdavis.edu, folder on “Government budget his-
torical series,” under the heading “Latin American fiscal redistribution”
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gyrated, and pension spending gyrated even more. Let us first describe our resulting 
estimates of how these gyrations in overall social spending twisted the incomes of 
the rich, middle, and poorest income groups, before turning to our interpretation of 
the complex pension reforms that were at the center of the storm.
The distribution of social spending since 1965. How did social spending affect 
people in different income ranks? To answer this question requires the procedure we 
previewed above, in which we apply today’s fiscal incidence of different social 
expenditures, and the average tax mix that is assumed to pay for them, to each 
year’s social spending as a share of GDP. Table 5 summarizes the recent unit impacts 
Table 5 Fiscal benefits and costs as shares of GDP for benchmark years
Social spending Taxes Benefits






0.8 0.8 0.2 2.2 0.5 2.1 2.6 −0.4
Quintile 2 0.8 0.7 0.5 2.3 0.5 2.0 2.5 −0.2
Quintile 3 0.8 0.6 0.9 2.5 0.5 2.0 2.4 0.1
Quintile 4 0.8 0.4 1.7 3.1 0.5 2.0 2.5 0.6
Quintile 5 (top) 0.7 0.2 3.1 4.9 1.0 4.0 5.0 −0.1




1.8 2.4 4.4 9.6 0.0 1.6 2.6 7.0
Quintile 2 1.3 1.3 1.3 4.8 0.0 1.8 3.0 1.8
Quintile 3 1.0 0.8 1.1 3.7 0.0 2.2 3.7 0.0
Quintile 4 0.6 0.4 0.8 2.4 0.0 2.2 3.9 −1.5
Quintile 5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.9 4.5 2.1 8.3 −7.3
All households 5.0 5.0 7.9 21.4 4.5 9.8 21.4 0.0
Uruguay 2000
Quintile 1 1.8 2.1 11.5 16.4 0.4 4.3 4.7 11.6
Quintile 2 0.6 0.9 2.4 4.3 0.8 3.0 3.8 0.4
Quintile 3 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.8 1.2 2.6 3.8 −2.0
Quintile 4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.9 2.7 4.5 −3.7
Quintile 5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 4.1 2.6 6.7 −6.4
All households 3.0 3.8 15.0 23.5 8.3 15.2 23.5 0.0
Colombia 1966
Quintile 1 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4
Quintile 2 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4
Quintile 3 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2
Quintile 4 0.7 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.3
Quintile 5 0.8 0.0 1.0 2.5 −1.4
All households 2.6 0.5 3.5 3.5 0.0
(continued)
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of each social program or tax on each of the five quintiles of households, in Chile 
and in three other countries.19
Concentrating on Chile’s experience since 1965, Fig. 3 reveals the estimated 
effects on different ranks by following two kinds of ratios. The ratio of the social 
payments to households in the top income quintile to those in the middle quintile, or 
Q5/Q3, represents (one plus) the “upper gap” we introduced earlier, and the ratio of 
the payments to households in the middle and bottom quintiles (Q3/Q1) represents 
the “lower gap”. During the military regime, the emphasis in social spending shifted 
in favor of the top 20 % of the income ranks, and their advantage in such payments 
has persisted ever since, although it is slowly declining. The bulk of this increase 
consisted of rising pension benefits favoring higher income households, and the 
pension movements cry out for explanation.
Untangling the pension reforms of 1979–1981. The pension system set up by 
Chile’s famous pension reform was, and still is, a huge share of annual GDP. To clear 
the way for understanding its effects, one should begin by noting that it is not what it 
19 Our estimates actually use greater detail by social program than is shown in Table 5. For example, 
different unit impacts are applied for primary versus secondary versus tertiary education. See the 
Excel files within the Government Budget Historical Series folder of http://gpih.ucdavis.edu.
Table 5 (continued)
Sources and notes
Our estimates actually use greater detail by social program than is shown in Table 5. For example, 
different unit impacts are applied for primary versus secondary versus tertiary education. See the 
Excel files within the Government Budget Historical Series folder of http://gpih.ucdavis.edu
As noted in the text, the total taxes are equal to social expenditures, with the assumption that such 
expenditures are paid for in the same revenue-type proportions as in the aggregate budget
For Chile, the main sources are Engel et al. (1999), Lindert et al. (2006), Jorrat De Luis (2009), 
Rodriguez and Flores (2010), Cruz-Saco and Mesa Lago (1998, 69), and Acuña Rodrigo and 
Augusto Iglesias (2001, Table 5)
Note that for Chile the total social expenditures include more than the three subcategories (educa-
tion, health, and pensions). Chile's tax incidence shares are from Engel et al. (1999), and refer to 
1996. These shares of total revenue are applied to revenues and GDP for the year 2000
For Argentina the main sources are: Gasparini (1999), Sabaini et al. (2002), and Lustig et al. 
(2011). Note also that for Argentina the total tax revenues exceed the subcategories, due to inclu-
sion of social security contributions. For Argentina's social security contributions, the quintiles 
paid these shares in 2000: Q1 paid 0.98 % of GDP, Q2 paid 1.19 %, Q3 paid 1.57 %, Q4 paid 
1.65 %, and Q 5 paid 1.73 %
For Uruguay, we lack a historical time series on social security taxes. We have, however, the esti-
mated distribution of such taxes across quintiles. With this Uruguayan exception, we have included 
social security contributions separately in the revenues covering social expenditures. For the 
Uruguay estimates we had to allocate social security contributions to direct and indirect taxes, in 
the proportions assumed by the latter two
Around the year 2000, Uruguay’s bottom quintile (Q1) paid 13.81 %, Q2 paid 16.74 %, Q3 paid 
22.03 %, Q4 paid 23.21 %, and Q5 paid 24.20 %
For Colombia 1966, the main source is Berry and Urrutia (1976) Estimates covering the expendi-
ture side for Colombia in 1974 can be found in Selowsky (1979). There were no public pensions 
in 1966
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is often described to be. It was not a privatization of Social Security, as many have 
thought. There was no social security system to replace, but only a flawed and incom-
plete pension system for the privileged occupational groups of the formal sector. 
The reform also did not exactly privatize or liberalize pensions. It forced individuals 
to place pension contributions and benefits more firmly in the hands of the state and 
the private pension managing funds (AFPs) that the state appointed. It also raised the 
state’s commitments and pension deficits, and these are projected to continue until 
2045. Government pension spending, far from phasing out, truly soared.
The 1979–1981 pension reform needs to be understood as a system with these 
key features:
 (1) The Pinochet regime inherited a badly broken and underfunded pension system 
in which formal sector workers were being subsidized. The regime chose to 
honor their underfunded entitlements by creating new government obligations 
to be covered by general taxpayers.
 (2) The reform exempted the military from individualized forced savings or the 
defined-contribution feature. Military personnel continue to get generous net 
defined benefits from the taxpayers.
 (3) To convert from defined benefit pensions to a defined-contribution system for 
civilians, the regime and its post-1989 successors have had to pay deficits to the 
transition generation. The deficits continue.
More specifically:
First, as mentioned, the previous system was badly broken, and the rise of unsus-
tainable obligations was hidden from the official data of those pre-reform years. The 
occupational system for the more established formal-sector occupations, dating 
back to the 1920s, was increasingly mismanaged after about 1955. What had been a 
contributory system that should have funded itself slid into deficit, as more and 
more employees evaded making contributions while keeping their benefit entitle-
ments. Between 1955 and 1979 the ratio of contributors to pensioners fell from 12.2 
to 2.5, a result which cannot be explained by demographic trends, but rather resulted 
from allowing evasion of contributions while delivering generous benefits to those 
covered (Acuña Rodrigo and Augusto Iglesias 2001, p. 20).
For our accounting framework, this poses a huge problem of fiscal timing. As 
we had warned earlier, fiscal programs often give tax or benefit accruals in years 
that can be quite distant from the years of collection or payout. The 1979–1981 
Chilean reform is perhaps the region’s largest case of such a discrepancy. The obli-
gations taken on in the 1980s in effect honored formal sector workers’ evasion of 
pension contributions dating back to the 1950s, with benefits to be paid over sub-
sequent years in ways that our studies have trouble tracking year by year. The mili-
tary regime found itself inheriting a dilemma, one forcing it to choose between a 
shocking markdown of all occupational pension benefits and honoring the obliga-
tion to cover the full deficit. They chose the latter, with the result that the huge 
pension expenditures favoring higher-income beneficiaries suddenly show up in 
our graphs around 1975, even though they had secretly accrued over the previous 
two decades.
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Second, as we have noted, the Pinochet regime did not dare to slash military 
pensions, nor did it include them in the forced-saving reform, even when holding its 
firmest grip on power.
Third, like any change in pension regime that tightens up, in pursuit of eliminat-
ing deficits, Chile’s new system faced the threat of double-taxing the transitional 
generation, forcing it to pay for the preceding generation’s retirement while also 
paying for its own. Like the military exemption, this necessitated deficits lasting for 
a generation, from 8.4 % of GDP in 1982 to 3.9 % by the close of the century.20
At face value, the pension benefits suddenly became huge after the coup, and 
have stayed that way. In giving this impression Figs. 3 and 4 correctly portray what 
happened on an “accruals accounting” basis; yet they may mislead by portraying 
the movements as though the resources were paid out, in the cash accounting sense, 
at peak years like 1981–1986.
20 One further drawback of the reform design was avoidable, rather than inherent. The Chilean AFP 
(private pension fund administrators) system levied charges that are widely agreed to have been 
exorbitant. “One quarter of net (of insurance fees) mandatory contributions of the average Chilean 
contributor who retired in 2000 went to administration fees.” The fees loomed somewhat larger for 
lower earnings savers.
Fig. 4 Net benefits minus taxes paid, on social expenditure in Chile, 1965–2013. Sources and 
notes: see Appendix 1
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To portray the level, and the distribution, of pension benefits correctly, we have 
taken care to use measures of just the redistributive, or non-contributory part of all 
pension payments. Again, the part covered by current contributions is not redis-
tributive. For 1981 on, we can interpret the Acuña Rodrigo and Augusto Iglesias 
(2001, Table 5) social security deficit part of pension payments as the redistributive 
component. It was the “total social security deficit,” most of which was the “transi-
tory social security operational deficit,” with much smaller amounts for Recognition 
Bonds and for the more permanent welfare and minimum pensions.21 The measures 
for the 1970s and earlier are less straightforward, for want of a clear measure of the 
pension deficit in those years.22
The deficit was huge, taking at least 8.4 % of GDP in 1982, and still over 4 % at 
the dawn of this century. Clearly, the transition from a broken and underfunded 
system to a fully funded “defined contributions” system was fiscally costly for 
Chile, as it has also proved for other countries imitating Chile’s transition. It was 
also not progressive in Chile’s case, since the beneficiaries of the deficit were, and 
still tend to be, upper income groups, largely the same formal sector groups that 
underpaid for their pension entitlements before the reform.23
Adding in the tax side. For Chile we have an opportunity to complete our counter-
factual on the tax side. That is, there exist studies of how different kinds of taxes are 
distributed across the income groups “today,” where today is the year 1996, thanks to 
Engel et al. (1999). Their article on “unpleasant redistributive arithmetic” derived 
Chile’s distribution of direct taxes versus two kinds of indirect taxes in 1996, and we 
were able to apply their separate distributions to the shares of direct and indirect taxes 
back to 1965. This yields the distribution of taxes between high-, middle-, and low-
21 Had we instead used the “state subsidy to social security” share of GDP given by Cruz-Saco and 
Mesa-Lago (1998, p. 69), the estimates would have been slightly higher—e.g., 8.8 % of GDP 
instead of 8.4 % for 1982, and 6.6 % instead of 4.8 % for 1993.
22 We assume that before 1955 there was zero net deficit and zero redistribution. That is, we assume 
that the pre-1955 pensions in the public accounts were wholly contributory. Acuña Rodrigo and 
Augusto Iglesias (2001) note that there were many contributors per recipient then, but that the sys-
tem fell apart under mismanagement until the Pinochet reforms. What to do about the years 1955–
1981? It would seem natural to imagine a drop in the contributory share from 100 to 0 % over these 
years. This would understate the rise in regressive redistribution toward the rich, since the official 
data on pension payments record only low out-payments in these years, and not the hidden buildup 
of obligations that were recognized only after 1981. We have no choice but to go with the available 
data, using a current cash-flow approach and assuming that the out-payments occurred only from 
1981 on. Much post-1981 regressivity actually accrued earlier. For 1976–1980, we interpret the 
“otros funciones sociales” as fully non-contributory and as regressive as the non-PASIS pensions at 
the end of the century. From 1981 on, we apply the Acuña-Iglesias social security deficit as the non-
contributory part of both social security (previsión) and “other social programs.”
Note that these pension payments and the special “otras funciones sociales” payments remain 
outside the usual calculations of annual disposable or final income in the year in which they are 
paid by the government. They trickled into benefits in earlier years in the case of pensions, and 
possibly later years for other programs.
23 The quantitative embodiment of this statement is that for the pension recipients’ payments out of 
the deficit we used the quintile shares estimated for Chile’s non-PASIS pensions in Lindert et al. 
(2006, Tables 7 and 8).
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income groups shown already in Fig. 3, and now in Fig. 4. Both portrayals show that 
the years of military rule were remarkably favorable to top income groups and unfa-
vorable to the bottom, relative to the earlier and later regimes of democratically 
elected governments. Adding taxes into the picture shows an additional reason why: 
the top 20 % got a relative tax break, one that was largely reversed by the concertación 
government starting in 1991, as is also clear in Figs. 3 and 4.
Chile’s shift toward more progressive redistribution, and lower post-fisc inequal-
ity, since 2000 has been widely noted.24 Our Figs. 3 and 4 confirm the rise in redis-
tributive progressivity. The middle income groups regained a net positive fiscal 
effect across the 1990s, and the poorest quintile gained positive redistribution from 
2005 on. The underlying mechanism, while not entirely clear, seems to have worked 
mainly on the tax side. Direct tax collections rose considerably as a share of govern-
ment revenue, while the value added tax dropped. Given that the former fall mainly 
on the top quintile and the latter are neutral or slightly regressive, the revenue shift 
should have been progressive, as our figures imply.
4.1.2  Argentina Since World War II
Argentina’s commitment to social spending gained steam during Perón’s adminis-
tration with expansion of education and social security; however, these policies 
were consolidated in later decades, as social spending became a larger share of the 
budget. This evolution was far from steady, as the Argentine economy failed to 
achieve stable economic growth. The social welfare state suffered a setback in the 
late 1970s with a sharp impact on the social security and labor market programs 
paired with a more regressive taxation system. Employer contributions were seen as 
detrimental to the private sector’s competitiveness, resulting into their subsequent 
abolition. With lower direct tax collection and increasing inflation tax, the net ben-
efits of the bottom quintile stagnated at best. From the 1980s onwards, while social 
spending increased in terms of GDP, this rise was far from stable. Social spending 
has been more volatile than GDP growth and has run pro-cyclically. This combina-
tion has eroded its effectiveness as progress in education and health requires sus-
tainable social spending. That said, the sheer magnitude of Argentina’s tax effort on 
behalf of social spending, as a share of GDP, jumped far ahead of Chile’s in the 
1990s, under Menem. Argentina’s greater social spending share has not fallen back 
in the twenty-first century, despite the depth of the 2001 crash and the steepness of 
the subsequent recovery.
State-induced redistribution. With the advent of populism in Argentina, income 
redistribution towards the popular class became a priority for the new government. 
Under Perón’s initial presidencies (1946–1955), the public sector quickly expanded 
24 For example, see Chile’s redistribution coefficients in global perspective in Solt (2009, 2014). 
Rodriguez Weber (this volume) finds a leveling in pre-fisc labor earnings from 1988 to 2000, but 
no pre-fisc leveling after 2000. Combining his result with the others would suggest, again, a shift 
toward progressive redistribution after 2000.
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with the proliferation of ministries and the takeover of public utilities.25 Social 
spending followed the trend, with education rising from 6 % of the budget to nearly 
15 % by the end of the term. This commitment to education translated into a rise in 
enrollment reaching 50 % of the children in schooling age, a net 12-percentage- 
point increase from 1945 (Véganzonès and Winograd 1997). While education was 
an important component of social spending before 1970, the expansion of the pen-
sion system’s coverage turned into an important source of benefits, mostly to the 
urban population.26 The redistributive efforts worked, as wage earners’ GDP share 
climbed ten percentage points by 1954 to reach over 48 % of GDP by 1954.27 This 
impressive gain, however, was mostly due to public credit policies increasing mon-
etary wages, including a very popular innovation of the compulsory Christmas 
bonus (the “Aguinaldo”).28 Taking advantage of the taxation infrastructure estab-
lished in the 1930s, the government expanded taxation by increasing rates . Faced 
with insufficient revenue, sales taxes rose from 1.25 to 8 % while profit and export 
taxes were also targets (Blanco 1956; Gerchunoff 1989). Later, the government 
attempted to ameliorate the regressive character of the tax system by decreasing 
taxes of basic necessities (Banco Central 1955).
More significant was the progressive role of the income tax (see Fig. 5). The top 
rates were increased from 7 to 22 % in 1942 to be revised again a decade later 
(Alvaredo 2007). Income tax collection grew accordingly reaching 2.7 % of GDP 
during the Peronato compared to 0.7 % during the previous decade.
The revenue-enhancing reforms failed to cover the growing public expenditure, 
and the government resorted to tapping social security funds. The growing imbal-
ance of the fiscal accounts translated into inflation, reaching nearly 10 % of GDP in 
1949. Though it decreased subsequently, the inflation tax was to remain a feature in 
the fiscal and daily lives of Argentina.
Consolidation and retreat of social spending with less progressive taxation, 1955–
1989. Life after Perón was plagued with sudden changes in economic policy. The 
intermittent and interrupted long-term and stabilization programs hampered economic 
growth. In terms of social spending, the central government devoted considerable 
resources in the 1960s and 1970s to reach around 10 % of GDP, and over 25 % for all 
levels of government combined. Social assistance transfers (pensions and “other”) 
represented nearly 40 % of all social spending by the central government. Progressive 
taxation remained in place for another decade post Perón but it had unraveled by 
mid-1970s with a substantial decrease in direct taxes as a source of revenue.29
25 Moreover, an increasing share of public expenditure was off the treasury records such as state 
railroads, the trade institute (IAPI), and the national mortgage bank.
26 By the turn of the twentieth century, the pension system in Argentina included only public 
employees. Before Peronist times, the system expanded to include employees from banking, insur-
ance, press, and naval and air transportation (Arza 2010).
27 Estimations based on CEPAL (1958) considering only salaries.
28 Established by Decree number 33.302/45. Technically, this extra salary was established before 
Perón’s presidencies; however, the origin of this idea is traced to Perón’s stint as Secretary of Labor 
between 1943 and 1945.
29 Again see Fig. 5. Gaggero (2008) maintains that the elites and their short-run macroeconomic 
policies are to blame for this development.
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Curiously the military governments did not eradicate the welfare state introduced 
by Perón, but consolidated it with an array of inefficient policies within the frame-
work of a state-oriented economy.30 Dubbed as paternalistic and rooted in Catholic 
views of a more unified society, the state expanded social security to include a new 
national housing system (FONAVI) funded by employers’ tax contributions. 
However, this expansion was short-lived. In 1979 the employers’ contributions are 
abolished, defunding the pension system and the public housing program. This sharp 
turn in social policy reduced the relative benefits of the top and middle quintiles as 
shown in Fig. 5. This slash of the benefits was outweighed by the government’s rising 
use of the sales tax to recoup revenue (Marshall 1988). With inflation graduating 
from moderate to high (and even reaching hyperinflation in 1989 and 1990), 
the taxation system turned much more regressive.31 For the 1980s, the inflation tax 
incidence on wage earners hovered around 2.2 to nearly 6 % of GDP per year. 
However, the impact was 3:1 when comparing the first to the fifth quintile, making 
the tax incidence more regressive due to the increasing monetization of the fiscal 
30 Franco (1992) claims that the social policies in Latin America during this period were useless as 
they only granted segmented access and excluding universalism.
31 As our estimations for relative tax incidence are based on 2009 figures, the impact of inflation tax 
is absent. Given its regressive nature, our estimates of tax incidence for the late 1980s most likely 
appear more progressive than they probably were.
Fig. 5 Benefits of social spending, rich vs. middle vs. poor, Urban Argentina, 1870–2009. Sources 
and notes: see Appendix 1
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deficit (Ahumada et al. 1993). Figure 6 shows the regressive net effect of this combi-
nation in the 1980s.
The rise of social spending along with changes in taxation, 1990–2013. Since 
1992 Argentina’s social spending has been more volatile, pro-cyclical—and more 
progressive, as shown in Figs. 5 and 6. Spending on social security has expanded, 
and the pension system alone reached almost 74 % of total spending in 2013. This 
time, however, the rise in pensions was progressive. The extension of coverage and 
the rise in social security paychecks explains most of this increase. Consistent with 
the retreat of post-fisc inequality observed in the 2000s, the net fiscal benefits for the 
bottom quintile increased substantially to nearly reach 5 % of GDP.32 On the taxa-
tion side, the Menem government introduced a two-sided change. On the regressive 
side, it relied more on the value-added tax with rates climbing to 21 % while the 
income tax rate for the top bracket was reduced to 33 % in 1997 (to be increased 
32 On volatility and pro-cyclicality, the correlation between real GDP and real social spending is 
above 0.8 for using both central and total government spending. When testing changes in real GDP 
vs. changes in real social spending the coefficient drops to 0.5. The volatility of real social spend-
ing relative to real GDP (measured as the standard deviation of the annual real changes) is three 
times higher.
On the changes in the design of social security, see Selva and Iñiguez (2009).
Fig. 6 Net Benefits minus taxes paid, on social spending by consolidated government, Argentina 
1970–2009. Sources and notes: see Appendix 1
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2 percentage points 3 years later). Yet at the same time, it improved tax collection 
by reducing evasion. This latter, progressive, side of the coin takes on a strong form 
in our Figs. 5 and 6, which show a trend toward progressivity shared by the other-
wise very different presidencies from Menem to the Kirschners.
The impact of this mix actually worsened inequality in the late 1990s, according to 
CEPAL estimates.33 Still, the expansion of social spending with an increase of overall 
tax collection gave rise to a more progressive fiscal redistribution since 1992.
4.1.3  Uruguay, the Social Spending Leader Over the Last 100 Years
Though the region has lagged in public education spending ever since Independence, 
Uruguay was an early leader in education levels, helped by its initially high income 
(Lindert 2010; Rodriguez Weber and Thorp 2013). Its commitment to primary 
and secondary education did not flag, although Chile and Argentina caught up by 
the 1930s.
In terms of social assistance, the 1930s saw a jump, due to enlarging the social 
security system, and to expanding the pension system to cover workers in the for-
mal industry and commerce sectors.
What shows up even more clearly in the history of social spending is a consistent 
Uruguayan tendency toward equalizing incomes. As shown in Fig. 7, Uruguay’s 
33 Cetrángolo and Gómez-Sabaini (2006).
Fig. 7 Benefits of social spending benefits minus taxes for them, rich vs. middle vs. poor, Uruguay 
1910–2008. Sources and notes: see Appendix 1
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social spending has been highly progressive throughout the last 100 years. The long 
rise of the redistribution in terms of GDP, so conspicuous in Fig. 7, is due mainly to 
the expansion in the size of social budgets, rather than to any shift toward greater 
unit progressivity of social programs. For at least a 100 years Uruguay has had a 
more progressive mix of social programs than in Chile.34 Certainly the mix is more 
progressive today, as Table 5 testifies.
One potential interruption to the upward march of social spending came with 
military rule in 1973–1985. In this respect Uruguay’s time path could have resem-
bled that of Chile and Argentina. Yet in Uruguay the military rule did not reverse 
either the expansionary trend or the progressivity of social programs, as evident in 
Fig. 7. Thus Uruguay stands out as the region with the longest-standing trend toward 
progressive redistribution.
4.1.4  Colombia—Half Progressive, Half Regressive
Colombia’s patterns of fiscal incidence are decidedly mixed, according to two stud-
ies of social spending and taxes in the 1960s and 1970s. On the one hand, public 
primary education and all rural public services have been progressive, even in the 
“clearly progressive” sense delineated in Table 3 above. Subsidies to university 
education were highly regressive, in Colombia as elsewhere, although the magni-
tude of university subsidies was small in relation to the amounts given out in the 
other programs. Also regressive were urban public services. On balance, the entire 
fiscal system seems to have redistributed only a small share of national income, 
perhaps 1.4 %, from the top quintile the other 80 % of the population as of 1966.35
On the pension front, once public pensions were started in 1967, Colombia has 
followed in Chile’s footsteps, both in the under-contribution problem inherited by 
reformers in 1993 and in the regressive deficits that the reforms brought to light. 
Again, as in Chile, repairing and removing the handover from the previous defined 
benefit system have proven difficult ever since the reforms were launched, in this 
case by Law 100 in 1993. Though the reform tried to set up a pension reserve, it was 
exhausted as early as 2004. Since the pension system covers only 25–27 % of the 
labor market, under a dual private-public regressive scheme, the central government 
has been forced to cover pension deficits out of about a third of its total tax revenues, 
or nearly 5 % of GDP. As shown in Table 4, Colombia fits the regional pattern of 
veering toward dominance of non-contributory pensions in its social programs, 
despite attempts to curb this tendency.36
34 Azar et al. (2009) and Rodriguez Weber and Thorp (2013).
35 For Colombia 1966, the main source is Berry and Urrutia (1976). Estimates covering the expen-
diture side for Colombia in 1974 are found in Selowsky (1979). For the net result in 1966, see 
Table 5.
36 Clavijo 2009, pp. 3–14.
L.A. Abad and P.H. Lindert
273
4.1.5  Costa Rica Since the 1940s
As the available numbers in Table 4 suggest, Costa Rica has had a steadier growth 
of social spending than some of the other countries.
As compared with Uruguay, Costa Rica redistributes less progressively each year, 
in the sense of reducing the Gini coefficient of inequality. Yet as of 2003, it has 
achieved greater equality of final income, and also greater equality of original (mar-
ket, or pre-fisc) income. How? The contrast can have many explanations, including 
the countries’ fortunes in international trade. One element of social policy seems to 
have contributed. Since at least 1900, Costa Rica has poured a greater share of 
national product into public primary and secondary education than has Uruguay, and 
the difference persists in this century. Its broader skill base has produced more equal-
ity in the long run by equalizing basic earning power, thereby achieving a greater 
reduction in inequality than Uruguay’s more ambitious pensions and other transfer 
payments, even though both have existed since the dawn of the twentieth century. 
Here again, we must remember that each year’s egalitarian investments have a longer 
lasting, though delayed, effect on equality than that year’s expenditures can show.
On the public pension front, Costa Rica started developing its system early. Its 
pre-1948 institutional innovations became a permanent feature of Costa Rica's 
equity oriented policy framework, despite the defeat of the system’s original design-
ers during the civil war in 1949–1950. Costa Rica has more recently had the same 
problems of incomplete pension coverage and underfunding as in other countries, 
but these never became as serious as in Chile or Brazil or Colombia. The guidelines 
of social policy, like the larger issues of governance, were effectively resolved in the 
middle of the twentieth century, with a combination of political cooperation, fore-
sight, and a lucky boom in coffee exports.37
4.1.6  Peru Since the 1940s
Peru has always spent a lower share of GDP on social programs than even Chile, as 
Table 4 has shown. And on balance, its fiscal redistributions have not yielded any 
net progressivity. The social policies since the 1940s in Peru have derived from the 
role that the state played in the economy, swaying from interventionism to (neo)
liberalism. The steady growth of social spending since the 1940s was abruptly inter-
rupted with the crisis of the late 1980s, and then resumed in the following decades.
Modest progress under an interventionist state. From 1945 to 1948, the govern-
ment adopted a pro-distribution stance through income policies (such as price 
freezes and wage increases) and extension of social policies (including free and 
universal secondary education and the Sunday wage). The state was seen as a means 
of economic development and social integration and social spending increased 
accordingly. With a change to a more liberal regime the government implemented a 
37 On the early innovations, see Gonzalez-Vega and Céspedes (1993, pp. 82–85). For an appraisal 
of Costa Rica’s redistributive policies today, see Oviedo et al. (2015, pp. 23–61).
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more pragmatic social policy with selected programs in education and health. From 
a macroeconomic point of view, none of these initiatives amounted to more than 2 % 
of GDP. The government intervention to foster social progress had limited impact 
by the early 1960s. While the net benefits were progressive, they did little to over-
come the initial market-based inequalities, especially for the rural traditional sector. 
Confronted with this reality the military government headed by President Velasco 
(1968–1973) initiated an ambitious plan to redistribute income and wealth. This 
conscious commitment to redistribution translated into a significant increase in 
social spending.38
Crisis and reform. The 1980s meant a continuous struggle to achieve macroeco-
nomic stabilization resulting in a decrease of social and total public spending cul-
minating in hyperinflationary episodes in 1987–1990. In the following decade the 
reorganization of the public sector included an expansion of social spending, espe-
cially in education and health. That expansion notwithstanding, Peru’s fiscal redis-
tribution failed to be progressive overall, as shown by the studies that have led to 
Table 2.
5  Summary: What the Emerging Historical Patterns Suggest
Most countries’ social expenditure programs end up redistributing to an intermedi-
ate degree—that is, in the intermediate range shown in Table 2. They deliver a 
greater absolute value of benefits to higher income groups, relative to a flat per 
capita “poll subsidy.” That looks regressive. On the other hand, they deliver rewards 
that are less unequal than the distribution of original incomes. That means that their 
expenditure pattern dampens the serious inequalities of original income. This 
slightly progressive tendency is reinforced by the modest progressivity in tax rates 
as a share of original market income.
Of the six countries covered here, the two most progressive have been Uruguay 
and Argentina, which have historically met the standard of absolute progressivity 
for a few decades. To judge from the region-wide situation at the start of the twenty- 
first century, those two countries may have been the only absolutely progressive 
countries in all of Latin America, aside from Cuba.
To this pattern of only middling progressivity in social programs and taxes, we 
have added the easily documented tendency of Latin America to redistribute toward 
the current senior generation by investing little in the younger generations. Over 
recent decades the countries in the region have increasingly squandered lost eco-
nomic capital and growth by spending their political capital on subsidizing the older 
generations with non-contributory public pensions. Of the countries studied here, 
the Southern Cone has redistributed away from future generations the most, and 
38 On social policies up through the 1960s, see Contreras and Cueto (2004) and Webb (1975). 
President Velasco’s wealth redistribution policies included land reform, nationalization, and 
worker cooperatives (Figueroa 1995).
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Costa Rica has done so the least. While Peru and Colombia have also tended to tilt 
toward pensions, they have done so with smaller overall budgets in relation to GDP, 
and their regressive side has manifested itself in more conventional ways.
This low-investment tendency has featured a hundred-year history of lower 
investment in primary and secondary education. The implied prescription is to seize 
the opportunity, at last, of achieving both more equality and faster growth with 
broader investments in human skills. In this prescription our study seems to be in 
accord with the present-day prescription of Augusto de la Torre and co-authors:
“[E]fforts to equalize opportunities for human capital formation, particularly by broadening 
the access to high quality education regardless of socio-economic background, must be at 
the core of the search for shared prosperity in [Latin America and the Caribbean].”39
The region as a whole still has time to reduce the pension deficits that even 
Chile’s reform have not yet tamed. The opportunity is there because the region’s 
populations are still younger than those of the core OECD countries or Eastern 
Europe. Yet the political will may not be there, in view of how readily the appetite 
for non-contributory public pensions has grown since the 1960s, and how half- 
hearted the commitment to public education remains.
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 Appendix 1: Data Sources and Notes for Table 4 and Figs. 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
Table 4
Argentina
Revenue = 1900–1931: Vasquez-Presedo (1971), 1932–1964: AFIP (2009), 
1965–2006: Ministerio de Economía y Producción (2006), 2007–2013: AFIP 
(2010), AFIP (2011), AFIP (2012), AFIP (2013).
Expenditure = 1900–1915: Dirección General de Estadística (1915); 1929–1939: 
Vasquez-Presedo (1971); 1940–1962: Based on national budgets, Infoleg (2014), 
and IEERAL (1986); 1965–2006: Ministerio de Economía y Producción (2006), 
Oficina Nacional del Presupuesto (2014).
Nominal GDP = 1900–1932: Ferreres (2005); 1932–2013: Ministerio de 
Economia y Finanzas (2014ab).
Chile
Revenue and expenditure = until 2000: Díaz et al. (2010); 2000–2013: online data 
from Banco Central de Chile and Ministerio de Economía.
Nominal GDP = Warner et al. (2000).
Colombia
Revenue = 1900–1920: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 
(1973); 1920–2003: Junguito y Rincón (2007); 2004–2013: Banco Central de 
Colombia (2014). For detailed data on income and wealth taxes: Anuario de 
Estadística General, various numbers and Dirección General de Presupuesto Público 
Nacional (2014).
Expenditure = 1900–1920: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística 
(1973); 1920–2003: Junguito y Rincón (2007); 2004–2013: Banco Central de 
Colombia (2014). For detailed data on public expenditure by type: Anuario de 
Estadística General, Banco Central de Colombia (1997), Dirección General de 
Presupuesto Público Nacional (2014).
Nominal GDP = GRECO (1998, 1999) and Banco Central de Colombia (2014). 
Note that nominal GDP experienced significant increase in the 1990s and over 35 % 
from 1999 to 2000 due to a change in methodology. For the data series, see in http://
gpih.ucdavis.edu, the folder for “Government budget historical series,” under the 
heading “Latin American fiscal redistribution”, the file “Colombia central gov’t 
budgets 1901–2013.”
Costa Rica
Revenue = 1870–1958: total public revenue and by type kindly provided by Juan 
Diego Trejos. According to the tables, the data correspond to central government as 
reported by Román Trigo (1995). 1959–1970s: total public revenue and by type 
from Ramírez (1977); 1970–2013: total public revenue and by type from the 
Ministerio de Hacienda and the Central Bank of Costa Rica. Resource revenue cor-
responds to taxes on bananas and coffee. 1997–2012: Total revenue (including local 
government and decentralized units excluding the financial sector): Ministerio de 
Hacienda. Gobierno General: Ministerio de Hacienda (2014).
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Expenditure = 1870–1958: total public revenue and by type kindly provided by 
Juan Diego Trejos. According to the tables, the data correspond to central govern-
ment as reported by Román Trigo (1995). 1973–2013: Total and debt expenditure: 
from the Ministerio de Hacienda and the Central Bank of Costa Rica. 1991–2013: 
Social expenditure estimated based on CEPAL. 1997–2012: Total expenditure 
(including local government and decentralized units excluding the financial sector): 
Secretaría Técnica de la Autoridad Presupuestaria Unidad de Análisis y Seguimiento 
Fiscal (2014) and Sauma and Trejos (1999).
Nominal GDP and nominal investment = 1950–2003: data kindly provided by 
Juan Diego Trejos; 2004–2014: Central Bank of Costa Rica. Note that the GDP was 
re-estimated starting in 1991 resulting in a 25–35 % increase in GDP.
For the data series, see in http://gpih.ucdavis.edu, the folder for “Government 
budget historical series,” under the heading “Latin American fiscal redistribution”, 
the file “Costa Rica fiscal 1870–2013.”
Peru
Revenue = Total and composition: 1900–1989: Portocarrero et al. (1992), 1990–
2013: Banco Central de Peru (2014).
Expenditure = Total: 1900–1989: Portocarrero et al. (1992), 1990–2013: Banco 
Central de Peru (2014). Composition: 1900–1989: Portocarrero et al. (1992); 1970–
2013: Debt payments: Banco Central de Peru (2014); 1998–2013: Education and 
Health: Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (2014b), Defense and Pensions: 
Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (2014a).
Nominal GDP = 1900–1949: Seminario and Beltrán (1998); 1950–2013: Banco 
Central de Peru (2014).
For the data series, see in http://gpih.ucdavis.edu, the folder for “Government 
budget historical series,”under the heading“ Latin American fiscal redistribution,” 
the file “Peru gov’t budgets 1900–2013.”
Uruguay
Revenue, expenditure, and nominal GDP = until 1999 Azar et al. (2009); 2000–
2008 online data from Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas.
Figure 1 (gross capital formation)
The source is World Bank (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/), accessed 13 
March 2014.
Figure 2 (education versus pensions)
The sources are as listed for Table 1.
Figures 3 and 4 (Chile)
The sources for fiscal data and nominal GDP are as listed for Table 4. The esti-
mates of fiscal redistribution have utilized the studies by Engel et al., K. Lindert 
et al., and Lustig et al., as quantified in http://gpih.ucdavis.edu, the folder for 
“Government budget historical series,” under the heading “Latin American fiscal 
redistribution,” the file “Chile quintile effects 1842–2013.”
Figures 5 and 6 (Argentina)
The sources for fiscal data and nominal GDP are as listed for Table 4. The esti-
mates of fiscal redistribution have utilized the studies by Gasparini, Gómez Sabaini 
et al., Subsecretaria de Coordinación Económica, Lustig et al., SEDLAC, and 
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UNU-Wider cited in http://gpih.ucdavis.edu the folder for “Government budget his-
torical series,” under the heading “Latin American fiscal redistribution,” the file 
“Argentina fiscal incidence 1870–2009.”
The level of government portrayed here varies by parameter and by time period. 
As far as we can determine from Gasparini (1999) and Lustig (2011), the allocation 
of recent-benchmark fiscal incidence effects refers to the effects of all consolidated 
government, not just central government. These recent-benchmark allocations are 
based on survey data, without any clear distinctions as to the level of government 
doing the taxing or making the social expenditures. When it comes to the historical 
fiscal data, however, the scope of government differs as follows:
For 1870–1949, central government budgetary data only
For 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965, central, provincial, plus municipal govern-
ments; and for 1970–2009, consolidated accounts for all levels of government
Figure 7 (Uruguay)
The historical series on social budgets are from Azar et al. (2009). The distribu-
tion of household income per capita by decile, year 2000 is from WIID2c, down-
loaded January 2014, www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/. The 
fiscal incidence assumptions are borrowed from Buchele et al. (2013). See the cal-
culations in http://gpih.ucdavis.edu, the folder for “Government budget historical 
series,” under the heading “Latin American fiscal redistribution,” the file “Uruguay 
quintile fiscal effects 1910–2008.”
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